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Abstract 
The European emission trading scheme (EU ETS) has introduced a price 
for carbon and has thus led to an additional cost for companies that are 
regulated by the scheme. There is a growing body of empirical literature that 
investigates the effects of the EU ETS on firm economic performance. 
However, the results found to date are mixed.  
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effect 
of the EU ETS on economic performance at the firm level. Differently from 
the previous literature, we test the effect of the EU ETS on a larger set of 
indicators of economic performance: value added, turnover, employment, 
investment, labour productivity, total factor productivity and markup. 
Moreover, we evaluate the extent to which the impact of the EU ETS differs 
depending on some observable features of firms. 
Our results, based on a large panel of European firms, provide a 
comprehensive picture of the economic impact of the EU ETS in its first and 
second phases of implementation. The evidence suggests that the EU ETS 
had a positive impact on the scale of treated firms, whereas it had a negative 
impact on scale-free aspects of economic performance.  
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1. Introduction 
An Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), similarly to other alternative climate change 
policy instruments, is expected to lead to new costs for companies, because it requires 
firms to either buy permits to pollute or, alternatively, to bear the cost of abating 
emissions
1
.
 
Therefore, according to the traditional view, an emission trading system is 
likely to decrease firm’s economic performance (Coase, 1981; Baumol and Oates, 
1988).  
Indeed, companies subjected to the EU ETS, which is the scheme introduced by the 
European Union in 2005 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, have always claimed the 
risks of losing jobs, reduced competitiveness and decreased market share relative to 
companies outside the EU ETS (with the extreme case of re-location to unregulated 
countries). Therefore, analyses that attempt to address this issue are of strong policy 
interest for both industrial emitters and policymakers (Martin et al., 2014a). In 
particular, it is relevant to analyze the economic effects of the European scheme, 
because this scheme constitutes the most important policy tool for climate change 
mitigation of the European Union and the largest carbon trading market implemented in 
the world thus far.  
Empirical ex-post analyses on the impact of the EU ETS on firm performance have 
attained mixed conclusions. Certain studies have found positive or not significant 
effects of the EU ETS on economic performance of companies, whereas other papers 
have found negative effects or no impact at all (Martin et al., 2015, Convery, 2009).  
Our paper investigates the effect of the EU ETS on firm-level economic and financial 
indicators. As opposed to other recent studies, we evaluate a larger variety of measures 
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An ETS works in the following way: the Regulator, at the beginning of the compliance period, allocates 
a number of emission allowances (or permits) to the regulated plants, thus setting a maximum cap for 
pollution. The plants then can trade the allowances according to their pollution needs: plants that need to 
pollute more will buy permits, whereas plants that need to pollute less will sell permits. At the end of each 
compliance period, participants to the scheme are required to surrender as much permits as their verified 
emissions.  
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of performance. Thus, our paper describes a broader picture of the phenomenon under 
analysis and thus provides new insights into the mixed results found in the literature to 
date. Our analysis is based on a large panel of European firms and our results show how 
the economic/financial indicators of the ETS firms have evolved relatively to similar 
firms that were not involved in the ETS during the first and second phases of the EU 
ETS (2005-2007 and 2008-2012)
2
. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent evidence on the 
evaluation of the impact of the EU ETS on firm performance. Section 3 describes the 
data used for our empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy we 
adopt. Results are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Martin et al. (2015) reviewed the empirical evidence on the impact of the EU ETS on 
various dimensions and pointed out that EU ETS ex-post evaluations are “still very 
much work in progress”. Most empirical studies on the effect of the EU ETS on firm 
economic performance are very recent, and not many have previously passed the 
refereeing process of academic journals. These studies differ substantially in terms of 
empirical strategy, sectoral and geographical scope and the selection of indicators that 
they evaluate.  
There are studies that focus solely on one European country. Wagner et al. (2014) 
found a negative effect of EU ETS on employment on a panel of French firms. In 
contrast, Petrick and Wagner (2014) found no significant effect of the EU ETS on 
employment for a sample of German firms. They also analyzed the impact of EU ETS 
on gross output and exports and found no effect on gross output in the first phase but a 
significant and positive effect in the second phase; however, a positive and significant 
effect of on export was found in both phases. Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) conducted 
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The EU ETS is operative since 2005 (Directive 2003/87/EC). It started with a first pilot phase from 2005 
to 2007, followed by a second phase from 2008 to 2012.  
4 
a similar analysis on revenues and employment on German firms related solely to the 
first phase of the EU ETS. They found no significant effects. 
Other studies cover a larger selection of European countries. Abrell et al. (2011) 
investigated the effect of EU ETS on profit margins, value added and employment on a 
dataset of European companies; for their analysis, they combined data from the EU ETS 
Transaction Log with the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk). They found no 
significant impact of the EU ETS on profit margins and value added and a small, but 
significant, negative effect on employment.  
Early studies solely investigated the first phase of the EU ETS. Commins et al. 
(2009) studied the impact of EU ETS on total factor productivity (TFP), returns to 
capital, employment and tangible investments on a sample of European firms. They 
found a negative effect for TFP and returns to capital but no significant effect for 
employment and tangible investments.  
Martin et al. (2015) concluded that “one priority for future research on the EU ETS 
is the further development of firm-level micro-data, in terms of both outcome variables 
available and geographical coverage”. 
Our contribution to this emerging literature is manifold. Compared to existing 
studies, (i) we evaluate a larger selection of outcome variables, (ii) on a larger selection 
of EU countries, and (iii) we evaluate how the effect of the EU ETS differs according to 
various observable characteristics of firms.  
3. Data 
EU ETS allowances are allocated at the installation level, not at the company level
3
. 
Information regarding obligated installations, their respective account holders, 
compliance and transaction data is stored within the European Union Transaction Log 
(EUTL). For our firm-level analysis, it is essential to establish the link between these 
EU ETS accounts at the installation level and the corresponding parent companies. 
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 The EU ETS covers more than 11.000 installations that operate in emission-intensive sectors. 
5 
However, limited and/or incomplete information is provided on the associated firms in 
the EUTL
4
.  
The “Ownership links and enhanced European Transaction Log dataset project” 
(Jaraite et al., 2013) is the outcome of the matching of the EU ETS accounts at the 
installation level to their parent companies
5
. However, the years covered by this 
database are from 2005 to 2007, which corresponds to the first phase of the EU ETS. To 
extend the matching of this database to the second phase, we assume that new 
companies have not entered the market starting from the second phase and that 
companies participating in the first phase continue to participate in the second phase.
6
  
The matching between installations and companies performed by Jaraite et al. (2013) 
assigns installations to the ultimate owner that can be linked to the company identifier 
of Bureau van Dijk’s databases. Amadeus, by Bureau van Dijk, is a database of 
comparable financial and business information of European companies and includes 
standardized annual accounts (consolidated and unconsolidated), financial ratios, 
sectoral activities and ownership data. Because the EU ETS began in 2005 and because 
we want to observe a sufficiently large pre-treatment period, we extend the current 
release of Amadeus (extracted in July 2014, coverage 2004-2012) with a previous 
release of Amadeus (firms observed from 2002 to 2010).  
Our operative sample is composed of 792 treated firms and 65,692 potential controls 
observed over the 2002-2012 period. We keep those firms based in EU ETS countries 
(EU28 plus Norway, Lichtenstein and Norway), whereas we include all sectors in the 
                                                 
4
 National unique identifiers of companies that own EU ETS installations, as reported in the 'List of 
installation in the Union Registry', are missing or assigned to direct owners rather than to ultimate 
owners. Moreover, they are not compatible with the usable identifier in Amadeus in many cases (we use 
Amadeus for the construction of our dataset, as explained fore after).  
5
 The dataset is available at http://fsr.eui.eu/CPRU/EUTLTransactionData.aspx 
6
 To check how important this assumption is, we evaluate the amount of emissions in installations that 
entered the scheme in phase 2 only (Table 13 in Appendix A). This amounts to only 7.5 percent of 
verified emissions in the period 2008-2012. 
6 
economy
7
: many firms that operate in typically non-ETS sectors (e.g., the service 
sectors) continue to own establishments that are covered by the EU ETS.  
To reduce the heterogeneity of our sample, we keep only the companies that have, on 
average, more than 10 employees.
8
 Depending on the variable of interest, the extent to 
which our panel of firms is unbalanced may change, perhaps substantially. Our choice 
about firms that cannot be observed over the entire period has been to keep, for each 
variable, only those firms that appear at least once in each of our periods of interest: 
pre-treatment period (2002-2004), first phase (2005-2007) and second phase (2008-
2012). As a robustness check, we also keep only those firms (treated and controls) for 
which we observe our variable of interest for all years: this reduces the bias from 
attrition; however, in some cases, this substantially reduces the number of treated firms 
that we are consider (refer to paragraph 5.2). 
4. Estimation approach 
4.1 Identification strategy 
The challenge related to the empirical ex-post policy evaluations of the EU ETS is to 
establish a causal link between the policy itself and the changes in the outcome variable: 
this means that any change in the outcome variable can be ascribed only to the policy 
and not to a third factor that affects all treated firms. To analyze the causal impact of the 
EU ETS, we apply a difference-in-differences approach with pre-treatment matching. 
The treatment group is constituted by the firms that own at least one establishment that 
                                                 
7
 The only exception is represented by the exclusion of the aviation sector (NACE code 51). The aviation 
sector (flights within and from the EU, Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein) has been included in the 
scheme since year 2012. Differently from other sectors, for which fixed sources above certain thresholds 
are included, no matter the sector of operation of the firm, in the aviation sector permits and emissions 
refer to mobile sources (aircrafts). The difference in the timing of adoption of the policy, coupled with the 
substantially different potential impact on the sector, motivate this exclusion. 
8 
By excluding firms with less than 10 employees (on average over the period), we exclude 138 firms. It 
should be noted, however, many of these firms would have been excluded anyways as they have many 
missing values in our variables of interest, much more, in relative terms, than bigger firms. 
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participates in the EU ETS, whereas the control group is composed of similar non-EU 
ETS firms.  
As discussed by Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015), matching on observable 
characteristics is problematic when dealing with establishment-level data. This is due to 
the assignment rule of the EU ETS: the scheme covers all plants operating in 
participating countries that have installed capacity above certain sector-specific 
thresholds
9
. This means that it is not possible to find a good match for an ETS 
establishment given that any other establishment with the same size (in terms of 
installed capacity) operating in the same sector should be treated too. As suggested by 
Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015), however, the following situation may occur when the 
unit of observation is the company instead of the establishment: within the same sector 
and size class (not in terms of installed capacity, but in terms of employment, assets or 
turnover), there may exist at least one company that has one or more plants that are 
sufficiently large to be covered by the EU ETS and at least one company with no plants 
that meet the criteria for participating to the EU ETS. However, because the size and 
sector (and other features) of the company matters more for overall company 
performance than does installed capacity of each and every establishment, when using 
the firm as the unit of analysis, it is possible to have a common support between the 
treated and the control group in terms of observable characteristics. 
The treatment begins in 2005. The first phase of the EU ETS (2005-2007) was a pilot 
phase: no banking or borrowing of permits with the subsequent phase was allowed and 
allowances were allocated for free (“grandfathering”10). The second phase began in 
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 Sector-specific thresholds are reported in Annex I of the Directive 2003/87/EC (and subsequent 
amendments). We just report two examples of sector-specific thresholds, that is combustion installations 
with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW (except hazardous or municipal waste installations) and 
installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary fusion), including continuous 
casting, with a capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour. 
10
 
10
 “Grandfathering” is one of the possible methods of allocation of the pollution permits from the 
central authority to the emitters, at the beginning of the compliance period. Grandfathering consists in the 
free allocation of pollution permits, as opposed to the auctioning of permits. 
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2008 and incorporated some tighter provisions, e.g. higher penalty for non-compliance 
(from 40€ per ton of CO2 in the first phase to 100€ per ton), inclusion of N2O emissions 
and possibility of banking or borrowing of permits. Therefore, we expect more negative 
effects of the EU ETS on firm performance during the second phase. However, 
grandfathering remained the default allocation method also during the second phase. 
We evaluate the impact of the EU ETS on the following list of measures of economic 
and financial performance: value added (VA), number of employees (L), turnover, 
investment (gross fixed capital formation - GFCF), labour productivity (VA/L), average 
wages (average labour compensation per employee), return on investment (ROI), total 
factor productivity (TFP)
11
 and markup
12
. Monetary variables, expressed in euro, have 
been deflated to 2005 prices using country-sector-variable specific deflators from 
Eurostat. 
To identify the impact of the EU ETS on firm’s performance, we estimate the 
following econometric model: 
 
                                                          
                                (1) 
 
where: 
 αi is the firm fixed effect; 
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 We estimate TFP using the procedure developed by Ackerberg et al (2006) after estimating a translog 
production function separately for each two-digit industry. As a lag in the input of the production function 
is needed, TFP can only be estimated from year 2003 onwards. 
12
 Estimates of firm-specific markups are based on the procedure developed by De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012). Markups are computed as the ratio between labour share of total costs and the 
elasticity of value added to labour input which is estimated with a translog production function. As a lag 
in the input of the production function is needed, markups can only be estimated from year 2003 onwards. 
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          is a time-invariant dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that own at least 
one establishment subject to the EU ETS; 
         represents a dummy that equals one for the years of the first phase of the 
EU ETS, i.e. 2005, 2006 and 2007 and zero otherwise; similarly,         is a 
dummy for the years of the second phase, i.e. 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012; 
                          are sector dummies and country dummies interacted 
with a linear trend; 
    are year dummies; 
     is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Our parameters of interest are     and     that represent, respectively, the average 
treatment effect on the treated for phase 1 (2005-2007) and phase 2 (2008-2012) of the 
EU ETS compared with the pre-treatment period (2003-2004). We are also interested in 
testing whether a difference exists in the effect that we estimate for the two phases. This 
is done by testing the null hypothesis of equality between the average treatment effect 
on the treated for the two phases (           ). 
Although the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of firms is removed by 
including firm-specific fixed effects
13
, it could be the case that there exist other 
unobserved time-varying components that correlate both with the likelihood of being 
treated and firm’s performance. To control for these unobserved components, we 
include year dummies to control for EU-wide shocks that hit all countries and sectors in 
the same manner, country-specific linear trends that allow for differences in trends 
across countries (as a consequence, for example, to different macro-economic 
conditions or changes in the regulatory attitude that occurred within each country) and 
sector-specific linear trends that allow for differences in trends across sectors (due to, 
among other things, sector-specific trends in global demand and prices or to EU-wide 
changes in regulatory attitude towards specific sectors). 
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 The fixed effect is also particularly useful to control for panel attrition. Firms that are absent from the 
panel in particularly 'bad' or 'good' years could have influenced substantially our estimates of     and    . 
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We match treated and control companies based on the propensity score (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1985). The propensity score is the estimated probability of being treated 
given a set of observable characteristics of treated and untreated units. The use of a 
single synthetic variable that combines information about a variety of dimensions 
eliminates the dimensionality issue and allows to exploit efficiently the information 
contained in continuous variables. Conditional on the propensity score, the treatment is 
expected to be independent and the identification of the average treatment effect on 
treated is achieved.  
We first estimate, by means of a probit estimator, a propensity score that is function 
of a basic set of variables measured in year 2003. We include the following variables: 
number of employees (in log), growth of the number of employees from 2003 to 2004, 
capital intensity (log of fixed assets per employee), value added per employee (in log), 
age of the company, country dummies and sector dummies (2 digits NACE rev 1.1). 
[Tables and figures 
Table 1 about here] 
Results of the aggregate propensity score are reported in Tables and figures 
Table 1. As expected, the probability of being covered by the EU ETS is 
significantly and positively correlated with size (number of employees), capital intensity 
(stock of fixed capital per employee) and age of the firm. Conditional on these 
characteristics, firms that grow faster (growth in employment between 2003 and 2004) 
are more likely to be covered by the EU ETS: this may indicate a potential systematic 
difference in trends between treated firms and other firms. Finally, (unreported) industry 
and country dummies are strongly significant in predicting the likelihood of owning EU 
ETS establishments. 
To tighten the matching and to accommodate the different distribution of missing 
values for each of our measures of performance
14
, we estimate a different propensity 
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 For each measure of performance, we estimate the propensity score on the sample of treated and 
potential control firms for which we observe the dependent variable at least once in each phase (pre-
 
11 
score for each measure, in which we add to the basic set of covariates the pre-treatment 
level (2003) and growth rate (2003-2004) of the specific measure under scrutiny. In this 
way we are balancing the pre-treatment performance as well as the pre-treatment trends 
in the outcome variables.  
After having estimated the propensity scores, we match each ETS firm a maximum 
of 10 nearest neighbours (in terms of estimated propensity score) non-ETS firms. To 
reduce the risk of selecting firms that are not sufficiently similar to treated firms, we 
also impose a caliper of 0.05: controls firms that are not sufficiently similar (i.e. the 
distance in terms of the estimated probability of being treated with the corresponding 
treated firm is greater than 5 percent) are not included in the counterfactual, even if they 
fall in the group of the 10 nearest neighbours. The number of treated and matched 
control companies by country is reported in Table 2, whereas Table 3 shows the number 
of treated and matched control companies by sectors. Interestingly, the number of EU 
ETS firms that have no suitable match within the caliper that we define (i.e. they are off 
support) is small for all variables, ranging from 8 firms for ROI, turnover and 
employment to 1 for investments. In accordance with Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015), 
we decided to exclude these firms from our analysis rather than match them with 
substantially different untreated firms that could not act credibly as their counterfactual. 
Another interesting observation concerns the differences across different measures in 
terms of the number of treated and potential control firms. The smallest coverage is for 
markup and TFP. The estimation of these two measures requires observing their 
employment, capital stock, value added and turnover (also wage bill for markup) for at 
least two consecutive years. Coverage is also rather low for investment (GFCF) as many 
firms only invest sporadically. Finally, descriptive statistics about our set of 
performance measures are reported in Table 4.  
[Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
                                                                                                                                               
treatment, phase 1, phase 2), as other firms would not be included in the difference-in-differences 
regressions. 
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In Table 5, we report pre-treatment differences in the level (2003) and growth rate 
(2003-2004) of our set of measures of performance between ETS and non-ETS firms. 
Differences are reported for the whole potential sample of 'control' firms ('unmatched') 
and for the sample that is matched based on the propensity score, as described above 
('matched').  
[Table 5 about here] 
After matching, treated and control (‘Matched’) companies are not statistically 
different in the level and growth rate of our measures of performance, whereas the 
differences in the same dimensions between treated companies and the full sample of 
potential controls (‘Unmatched’) is large in magnitude and statistically significant for 
basically all variables. This finding means that the matching based on our estimate of 
the propensity score selects a sample of untreated matched firms that is, in principle, 
identical (on average) to the sample of treated firms, whereas the initial sample of 
potential controls is substantially different in all dimensions. Similarity in observable 
pre-treatment characteristics increases the credibility of the selected control firms as a 
appropriate counterfactual. 
4.2 Validity of identifying assumptions: pre-treatment common trend and 
SUTVA 
The validity of the difference-in-differences method relies on the assumption that the 
trend of the dependent variable would have been the same, in both the treatment and 
comparison groups, in the absence of the policy. The test about common pre-treatment 
trends is implicitly visible in Table 5, in which we test for differences in the pre-
treatment growth rates of our set of measures of performance; in all cases, the matching 
forces the control group to have, on average, the same pre-treatment trend in the 
outcome variable. 
Moreover, our     and     are unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect on 
treated if the treatment is expected to have no impact on untreated firms (Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption - SUTVA). The failure of this assumption would bias our 
estimates of     and   . Our empirical results may be partly affected by the possible 
13 
failure of the SUTVA, because matched firms are likely to operate in the same market 
of treated firms. For a given demand function, changes in the market share of treated 
firms necessarily implies changes (of opposite sign) in the market shares of firms 
belonging to the control group. This issue may be particularly relevant for 
markets/sectors that are characterized by high concentration. This would lead to 
opposite effects in terms of turnover, firm size and markups, between the two groups of 
firms (treated and control group) if we expect to be in a zero-sum game, thus leading to 
potentially upward biased effects.  
5. Results 
Before discussing the results of our estimates, it is worth evaluating descriptive 
trends in average measures of economic performance for treated and control firms 
(matched controls solely, weighted by matching weights) over the period that we 
consider (Figure 1). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
A few clear patterns appear by evaluating average trends in treated and control firms. 
First, the financial crisis has negatively influenced most measures of performance in 
2008 and 2009, with the exceptions (no apparent break) for wages, employment and 
investments. Secondly, for the pre-treatment trend (2003-2004), all measures of 
performance appear to be very similar for all variables. Again, this crucially depends on 
the inclusion of pre-treatment growth in outcome variables in the estimate of the 
propensity score. Lastly, the largest observed differences between treated and control 
groups in the pattern of outcome variables after 2005 (first year of the treatment) are for 
employment, investment (GFCF) and turnover, whereas minimal differences are evident 
for other variables. These three substantial departures in trends between the two groups 
of firms are always 'in favour' of EU ETS firms, that have experienced a systematically 
greater growth in employment, turnover and investment compared with their 
counterfactual. This preliminary evidence, however, should be validated by statistical 
evidence. 
5.1 Baseline results 
14 
Table 6 reports the results of our baseline estimates of equation 1 for our set of 
performance measures.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Aggregate descriptive evidence for employment, investments
15
 and turnover is 
generally confirmed by our statistical analysis: the difference between treated and 
controls is already significant since the first phase for turnover and investments (and 
remains significant, larger and stronger in the second phase), though it becomes 
significant only in the second phase for employment. The acceleration of the divergence 
between the two groups from the first to the second phase of the EU ETS is significant 
for all three variables. The effects are rather big in magnitude: compared to their control 
group in the second phase of the EU ETS, treated firms, have increased their 
employment by 7.9 log points (8.2 percent), their investment by 23.7 log points (26.7 
percent) and their turnover by 13.9 log points (14.9 percent).  
Value added increased slightly less than turnover (5.8 log points, 6 percent); the 
effect is significant solely for the second phase of the EU ETS. This suggests that the 
EU ETS, while driving up sales, has also increased material and other variable costs 
(that represent the difference between turnover and value added) more than 
proportionally.  
No significant effect on average wages and labour productivity (VA/L) is detected. 
We observe negative effects on TFP, profitability (ROI) and markups, the latter being 
significant only in the first phase. However, the magnitude of the effects is modest: TFP 
is reduced by about 1.6 percent in the first phase and by about 2.4 percent in the second 
phase, ROI is reduced by about 0.4-0.5 percent, that corresponds to less than one tenth 
of its sample interquartile range, in both phases. and markup is reduced by 1.5 percent. 
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 Results for investments should be interpreted with caution as this variable is intrinsically unbalanced: 
firms invest in fixed capital in an intermittent way, with large investments often followed by one or more 
periods (years) of absence of positive gross investments. As we only consider observations with strictly 
positive observed investments, our results for this variable can be generalized only to the population of 
firms that perform investments in every period.  
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All in all, the EU ETS appears to have positively influenced the scale of treated 
firms, measured in terms of turnover, value added, employment and investment. The 
only negative effects that are detected are on scale-free variables and they are small in 
magnitude. Summing up, our estimates suggest that the EU ETS, despite its negative 
(but small) impacts on productivity and profitability, has stimulated the growth of firms 
that own treated establishments.  
An explanation for these results might be that the EU ETS, by imposing additional 
fixed costs, has increased the minimum efficient productive scale of treated firms 
(employment and investment) and, consequently, their turnover and value added. This 
result might suggest that larger companies have had the possibility to better react to the 
introduction of the EU ETS: these companies are the ones that are expected to increase 
their average costs less than smaller companies, for which the additional fixed costs 
imposed by the EU ETS represent a larger share of total costs. 
To conclude, our results show mixed evidence on the overall impact of the EU ETS 
on economic and financial performance of firms. The effects go in both the directions, 
positive and negative, depending on the measure we are considering. However, our 
contribution resides in showing that the positive effects are related to the scale of the 
treated firms, whereas the negative effects are on scale-free aspects of economic 
performance.  
We detect stronger positive effects in the second phase (except in the case of ROI): 
this means that the effect of the EU ETS as an incentive to increase the scale has 
reinforced during the second phase. The negative effects have reinforced only in the 
case of ROI.  
5.2 Robustness checks 
As a first robustness check, we also repeat our analysis while tightening the matching 
algorithm and considering only the closest, in terms of estimated propensity score, 
untreated firm for each treated firm (nearest neighbour approach). Although the 
combination of a large pool of potential control firms and the requirement for matched 
firm to lie within a caliper reduce the risk of matching firms that are too different from 
treated ones, one nearest neighbour matching may help in estimating a lower bound of 
16 
our effects, at the cost of selecting matches that are only 'accidentally' similar to treated 
firms. Results are reported in Table 7. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Although the direction of the effects remains unaffected, we observe some 
differences with respect to our baseline estimates for what concerns the actual 
magnitude of the effects as well as their statistical significance. The positive impact on 
investment and turnover now appears only in the second phase of the EU ETS. 
Conversely, the impact on value added and ROI turns out to be not statistically 
significant. Finally, the size and statistical significance of the effect for markup and 
employment for the first and second phases, respectively, are now larger and stronger. 
As a second robustness check, we evaluate the stability of our results when 
considering only the samples for which we observe our outcome variable for all years 
(Table 8).
16
  
[Table 8 about here] 
For many variables we observe a rather large drop in the number of observations and 
in the number of treated firms as a consequence of imposing a balanced panel structure. 
Also in this case, results are qualitatively very similar to our baseline estimates. In 
contrast to our baseline estimates, however, we observe lack of significance in the first 
phase for turnover, investment and markup and in the second phase for employment. 
The effect of the EU ETS on specific categories of firms 
To have a more detailed and deeper understanding of the role played by the EU ETS 
in influencing economic performance of firms, we examine how the effect of the EU 
ETS varies with the following observable features of treated firms: firm-specific and 
sector-specific emission intensity, active involvement in the exchange of permits and 
propensity to innovate.  
We expect negative interaction effects of ETS for larger emitters and sectors that are 
systematically more emission-intensive, positive ones for firms that are actively 
                                                 
16
 We also re-estimate our propensity scores to accommodate for the new samples. 
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involved in the trading of permits and for firms that patent in environment-related 
fields. Firms and sectors that rely on emission-intensive processes are likely to suffer 
more (or gain less) from carbon pricing because this represents a greater share of their 
costs relative to less emission-intensive firms and sectors.  
We do not expect important gains for firms that are active in trading pollution 
allowances. Firms that are active in the permits market can profit from trading and, 
more generally, mitigate the ETS abatement costs in a more efficient way (Convery and 
Redmond, 2007; Martin et al., 2014b). However, companies that trade are the minority 
of all ETS companies. According to Martin et al. (2014b), EU ETS companies “do not 
consider carbon allowances as a financial asset that could provide profit opportunities. 
Rather, they see the EU ETS as providing a cap on emissions which they need to comply 
with”. In our sample, companies that trade represent the 35% of all ETS firms.  
Lastly, we expect a positive interaction effect for environmentally-patenting 
companies. Companies with environment-related patents may be able to gain from their 
innovations, which also include those induced by the EU ETS (Calel and 
Dechezleprêtre, 2014), thus reducing overall compliance costs (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995). 
Table 9 and Table 10 report results obtained by interacting the treatment variable 
with, respectively, firm- and sector-specific average emission intensity (logarithm of 
emissions per gross output). Data on emissions originates from the EU ETS registry for 
firm-level emissions and from Eurostat for sector-level emissions and output.
17
 To ease 
                                                 
17
 We decided to use time-invariant features of firms to limit the risk that these 'mediating' variables are 
influenced themselves by the treatment. If that was the case, identification of the treatment effect would 
have been less reliable as these variable would have been 'bad controls' (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
Firm-level emission intensity is computed as the ratio between average verified emissions in all 
installations owned by the firm for the period 2005-2012 and average firm turnover for the same period. 
Sector-level (64 sectors of the NACE rev. 2 classification) emission intensity is computed using economic 
and environmental accounts from Eurostat for years 2009, 2010 and 2011 as the average of CO2 
emissions per euro of turnover for the EU27 as a whole. 
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the interpretation of the interaction terms, we re-scaled the emission intensity variables 
to have the minimum observed emission intensity (in log) equal to zero. 
[Table 9 and Table 10 about here] 
In the first phase, companies with higher emissions reduced their employment and 
ROI more than companies with lower emissions did, whereas a negative and significant 
interaction term is estimated for turnover in the second phase. Results for other 
variables are far from statistically significant. When examining differences across 
sectors that are characterized by different emission intensities, we estimate negative and 
statistically significant interaction effects of the EU ETS for value added, labour 
productivity and average wages, but a weakly significant and positive effect is found for 
ROI in the second phase only. Excluding this latter result, the other estimates confirm 
that emission-intensive firms and sectors have been generally penalized by the EU ETS. 
We observe a penalization in terms of wages and labour productivity. A doubling in the 
emission intensity corresponds, in the second phase, to a decrease in average wages of 
2.8 percent and to a decrease in labour productivity of 5.3 percent. 
A second dimension that we consider as a possible source of heterogeneity in the 
effect of the EU ETS on firm performance is the involvement of firms in trading 
pollution permits. The variable “Active” represents the trade activity status and is equal 
to one when the company has traded at least once in the market for permits during the 
first or the second phase. Data on trade activity status originates from the EUTL 
registry. Results are reported in Table 11. 
[Table 11 about here] 
Being active in trading emission permits has a minimal influence on the impact of 
the EU ETS on firm performance. We only find some differences, in the first phase, for 
employment (negative interaction effect), labour productivity and average wages 
(positive interaction effect). The absence of differential effects in the second phase may 
indicate the limited possibility of 'playing around' in the permits market to reduce the 
cost of compliance. This absence of effects may be partly explained by the large drop in 
the price of carbon that was observed in the second phase of the EU ETS, which limited 
the potential losses from non-trading and the gains from trading. 
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Finally, we consider whether the EU ETS had heterogeneous effects on performance, 
depending on the extent to which firms are involved in the invention and development 
of environment-related technologies. Our time-invariant variable for patenting is a 
dummy that is equal to one if the firm has applied for at least one environmental patent 
to the European Patent Office over the years of our analysis. Data on environmental 
patents originates from OECD-Regpat database and follows the OECD-ENVTECH 
taxonomy of environmental technologies, whereas we use the match between applicants 
and firms provided by the Amadeus database. Results are reported in Table 12. 
[Table 12 about here] 
An interaction positive effect for patenting firms is detected for labour productivity, 
ROI and markup (the latter only in the first phase). These differential effects tend to be 
large in magnitude. It should be noted that these effects involve only scale-free 
measures of economic performance. This is totally in line with the Porter Hypothesis, 
which states that more innovative companies gain in terms of productivity in 
comparison to non-innovative ones. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the EU ETS on the economic performance of 
firms that own facilities that participate in the scheme. Our empirical approach aims at 
creating a proper counterfactual for treated firms in order to obtain unbiased estimates 
of the treatment effect. Moreover, we attempt to identify differences in these effects 
across firms with different observable characteristics. 
Our results suggest that the EU ETS has positively affected scale-related measures of 
economic performance and negatively, but slightly, influenced scale-free ones, 
especially so in the second phase. Our explanation for this finding is that the EU ETS, 
by imposing additional fixed costs, has increased the minimum efficient productive 
scale of treated firms.  
Moreover, we observe that emission-intensive firms and sectors have been 
characterized by a slightly worse economic performance, firms that have been active in 
trading allowances have not improved their performance remarkably and, lastly, firms 
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that have patented in environment-related technology fields have witnessed a better 
performance in some scale-free dimensions of economic performance. 
The results discussed in this paper provide a quantification on how the EU ETS 
influences a wide range of measures of performance. Further work is needed to better 
understand the mechanisms through which the EU ETS actually influence performance. 
The Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) can be a possible explanation of 
a positive effect of the EU ETS on firm performance (in the cases of value added, 
employment and turnover). Porter and van der Linde (1995) stated that environmental 
policies that stimulate green innovation may lead to positive innovation-related 
outcomes, which can, in turn, more than offset the negative effect of compliance costs 
on competitiveness and economic performance. We partially capture this effect with the 
interaction effect between our policy and environmental patenting activity. Another 
possible explanation may be the lobbying activity exercised by EU ETS companies and 
sectors on European authorities (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005; Svendsen, 2005; 
BÖringer and Rosendahl, 2009). EU ETS companies and sectors may have been able to 
obtain favourable conditions. For example, they obtained the grandfathering of permits 
in the first two phases and exemption from auctioning in the third phase (2013-2020) 
for sectors deemed to be exposed to the risk of carbon leakage, (see Martin et al., 
2014a). As suggested by Hepburn et al. (2006), these favourable conditions could have 
even reduced overall compliance costs for climate policies for emission-intensive EU 
ETS sectors compared with other non-ETS sectors. Finally, a third possible reason 
could be the low price of the pollution permits in the first two phases that reduced the 
cost of complying with the regulation (Koch et al., 2014). 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1 – Propensity score: baseline specification 
  Pr(ETS=1) 
log(empl) 0.328*** 
 
(0.0111)  
Growth empl (2003-2004) 0.0840**  
 
(0.0344)  
log(K/L) 0.243*** 
 
(0.0165)  
log(VA/L) 0.0404  
 
(0.0293)  
Age 0.00146**  
  (0.000588)  
Pseudo R sq 0.3075 
N 58021  
Table 2 – Firms by country 
  
Unmatched 
controls 
Matched 
controls 
Treated 
Belgium 2,416 1,115 40 
Bulgaria 685 210 18 
Czech Republic 1,844 324 7 
Germany 5,777 1,206 136 
Denmark 698 417 21 
Estonia 247 10 1 
Spain 4,708 2,464 115 
Finland 745 422 33 
France 7,524 1,355 51 
Italy 4,868 2,424 99 
Latvia 256 11 2 
Netherlands 2,028 556 33 
Norway 1,423 162 4 
Poland 3,214 946 43 
Portugal 1,290 105 10 
Romania 1,150 234 9 
Sweden 2,416 1,315 80 
Slovenia 145 120 6 
United Kingdom 8,565 2,303 84 
Total 49,999 15,693 792 
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Table 3 – Firms by sector (2 digits NACE rev. 2) 
NACE 
Potential 
controls 
Matched 
controls 
Treated 
 
NACE 
Potential 
controls 
Matched 
controls 
Treated 
10 2,417 1,678 62 
 
41 4,192 639 16 
11 506 405 18 
 
42 554 48 1 
12 40 38 3 
 
43 897 99 1 
13 460 377 15 
 
46 10,678 1,675 31 
14 178 53 1 
 
47 735 119 3 
16 415 275 12 
 
49 1,640 99 2 
17 338 605 47 
 
52 733 289 11 
18 397 72 1 
 
56 27 40 2 
19 79 78 9 
 
58 237 51 1 
20 1,224 915 41 
 
60 138 48 2 
21 592 215 9 
 
61 448 100 7 
22 1,500 198 3 
 
64 2,305 1,112 92 
23 546 858 58 
 
66 413 46 2 
24 711 489 22 
 
68 2,252 619 14 
25 1,549 256 4 
 
69 454 149 4 
26 327 44 1 
 
70 1,489 971 93 
27 853 260 8 
 
71 537 130 4 
28 1,050 192 7 
 
72 349 122 5 
29 1,034 154 5 
 
73 636 152 4 
30 410 103 4 
 
74 164 40 4 
31 363 55 1 
 
78 587 49 1 
32 274 132 4 
 
81 192 109 4 
33 218 15 1 
 
82 1,359 300 10 
35 588 690 123 
 
84 132 16 1 
36 273 172 6 
 
91 78 25 2 
37 247 13 1 
 
96 413 96 3 
38 371 208 6 
 
Total 49,999 15,693 792 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics 
  
Treated 
Matched 
controls 
Total 
 
  
Treated 
Matched 
controls 
Total 
 
  
Treated 
Matched 
controls 
Total 
log(VA) 
 
log(emp) 
 
log(VA/L) 
Average 11.047 10.919 10.984 
 
Average 6.683 6.485 6.584 
 
Average 4.394 4.434 4.414 
Min 1.901 1.154 1.154 
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Min 1.266 1.216 1.216 
Q1 9.242 9.446 9.331 
 
Q1 4.977 5.165 5.050 
 
Q1 4.019 3.919 3.970 
Median 10.624 10.765 10.709 
 
Median 6.265 6.317 6.295 
 
Median 4.425 4.387 4.408 
Q3 12.529 12.237 12.359 
 
Q3 8.237 7.730 7.928 
 
Q3 4.835 4.949 4.883 
Max 17.972 17.575 17.972 
 
Max 13.159 13.193 13.193 
 
Max 7.244 7.253 7.253 
SD 2.376 1.997 2.196 
 
SD 2.346 1.946 2.159 
 
SD 0.796 0.929 0.865 
IQR 3.287 2.792 3.028 
 
IQR 3.260 2.565 2.879 
 
IQR 0.816 1.030 0.913 
N firms 719 4121 4840 
 
N firms 753 4274 5027 
 
N firms 679 3907 4586 
Off-support treated firms 7 
 
Off-support treated firms 8 
 
Off-support treated firms 5 
Unmatched controls firms 38608 
 
Unmatched controls firms 40503 
 
Unmatched controls firms 37386 
log(av wages) 
 
TFP 
 
ROI 
Average 3.660 3.643 3.651 
 
Average 5.076 5.099 5.087 
 
Average 0.054 0.057 0.055 
Min 0.761 0.702 0.702 
 
Min 2.754 2.743 2.743 
 
Min -0.416 -0.452 -0.452 
Q1 3.509 3.441 3.478 
 
Q1 4.769 4.814 4.790 
 
Q1 0.018 0.015 0.017 
Median 3.770 3.772 3.771 
 
Median 5.076 5.130 5.104 
 
Median 0.046 0.049 0.047 
Q3 4.006 4.036 4.020 
 
Q3 5.462 5.455 5.459 
 
Q3 0.083 0.091 0.087 
Max 5.508 5.521 5.521 
 
Max 6.114 6.116 6.116 
 
Max 0.487 0.516 0.516 
SD 0.616 0.668 0.642 
 
SD 0.522 0.542 0.532 
 
SD 0.071 0.082 0.077 
IQR 0.497 0.595 0.542 
 
IQR 0.693 0.641 0.669 
 
IQR 0.065 0.076 0.070 
N firms 688 3980 4668 
 
N firms 533 2824 3357 
 
N firms 778 4541 5319 
Off-support treated firms 6 
 
Off-support treated firms 3 
 
Off-support treated firms 8 
Unmatched controls firms 37895 
 
Unmatched controls firms 28745 
 
Unmatched controls firms 40474 
log(GFCF) 
 
log(turn) 
 
Markup 
Average 9.824 9.584 9.704 
 
Average 12.371 12.186 12.279 
 
Average 1.404 1.382 1.393 
Min -4.646 -6.881 -6.881 
 
Min 0.013 -2.248 -2.248 
 
Min 0.565 0.559 0.559 
Q1 7.999 7.926 7.962 
 
Q1 10.630 10.765 10.701 
 
Q1 1.065 1.055 1.060 
Median 9.616 9.440 9.526 
 
Median 12.089 12.037 12.061 
 
Median 1.346 1.299 1.324 
Q3 11.497 11.219 11.365 
 
Q3 13.881 13.479 13.679 
 
Q3 1.695 1.623 1.661 
Max 17.804 17.373 17.804 
 
Max 19.670 19.263 19.670 
 
Max 2.885 2.902 2.902 
SD 2.670 2.389 2.536 
 
SD 2.370 1.990 2.191 
 
SD 0.441 0.437 0.439 
IQR 3.498 3.293 3.403 
 
IQR 3.251 2.714 2.978 
 
IQR 0.630 0.568 0.601 
N firms 551 3060 3661 
 
N firms 777 4548 5325 
 
N firms 497 2737 3234 
Off-support treated firms 1 
 
Off-support treated firms 8 
 
Off-support treated firms 5 
Unmatched controls firms 30710 
 
Unmatched controls firms 40001 
 
Unmatched controls firms 28715 
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Table 5 – Balancing properties of the propensity scores 
Variable   ETS Non-ETS t-test p-value 
log(VA, 2003) Unmatched 10.823 8.738 40.52 0.000 
 
Matched 10.92 10.845 0.66 0.507 
Change (2003-2004) log(VA) Unmatched .06012 .12454 -3.51 0.000 
  Matched .07055 .06259 0.28 0.782 
log(emp, 2003) Unmatched 6.628 4.7565 37.65 0.000 
 
Matched 6.6946 6.5465 1.37 0.171 
Change (2003-2004) log(emp) Unmatched -.0071 .03304 -2.16 0.031 
  Matched -.00385 .00787 -0.45 0.651 
log(VA/L, 2003) Unmatched 4.314 4.0128 9.02 0.000 
 
Matched 4.3074 4.3645 -1.19 0.233 
Change (2003-2004) log(VA/L) Unmatched .07307 .08399 -0.63 0.532 
  Matched .07345 .06019 0.57 0.570 
log(av wage, 2003) Unmatched 3.5173 3.4711 1.71 0.086 
 
Matched 3.5546 3.5525 0.06 0.952 
Change (2003-2004) log(av wage) Unmatched .05586 .06683 -0.97 0.333 
  Matched .0533 .05711 -0.27 0.784 
TFP, 2003 Unmatched 5.1301 5.0591 4.13 0.000 
 
Matched 5.1289 5.141 -0.37 0.712 
Change (2003-2004) TFP Unmatched .00577 .02036 -3.52 0.000 
  Matched .00568 .00088 0.87 0.386 
ROI, 2003 Unmatched .04814 .05909 -3.61 0.000 
 
Matched .05001 .04907 0.28 0.782 
Change (2003-2004) ROI Unmatched .01159 .00734 1.78 0.075 
  Matched .01089 .01096 -0.02 0.981 
log(GFCF, 2003) Unmatched 9.3572 6.455 37.51 0.000 
 
Matched 9.5879 9.5519 0.25 0.804 
Change (2003-2004) log(GFCF) Unmatched .18295 .14261 0.76 0.446 
  Matched .13306 .12448 0.11 0.909 
log(turnover, 2003) Unmatched 12.006 10.143 39.35 0.000 
 
Matched 12.243 12.14 0.96 0.336 
Change (2003-2004) log(turnover) Unmatched .0267 .1216 -4.91 0.000 
  Matched .01204 .01972 -0.19 0.849 
Markup, 2003 Unmatched 1.4176 1.0538 28.04 0.000 
 
Matched 1.4123 1.3991 0.48 0.634 
Change (2003-2004) markup Unmatched .02449 .02378 0.16 0.876 
  Matched .02504 .02578 -0.08 0.933 
 
 
28 
Figure 1 – Trends in economic and financial performance (non-ETS: matched control firms) 
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Table 6 – Baseline results  
  
Phase 1 
(2005-2007) 
  
Phase 2 
(2008-2012) 
  
Difference Phase 
2 - Phase 1 
  N 
log(VA) 0.0120 (0.0178) 0.0580** (0.0260) 0.0460** (0.0211) 49956 
log(emp) 0.00499 (0.0269) 0.0788* (0.0415) 0.0738** (0.0347) 51473 
log(VA/L) -0.0108 (0.0162) -0.0317 (0.0210) -0.0209 (0.0169) 45910 
log(av wage) 0.00476 (0.00927) -0.00517 (0.0116) -0.00992 (0.00835) 47310 
TFP -0.0158*** (0.00526) -0.0237*** (0.00705) -0.00790 (0.00502) 30491 
ROI -0.00441** (0.00220) -0.00487** (0.00247) -0.000457* (0.00225) 55894 
log(GFCF) 0.154*** (0.0474) 0.237*** (0.0542) 0.0827** (0.0496) 31475 
log(turnover) 0.0412* (0.0235) 0.139*** (0.0336) 0.0978** (0.0261) 56072 
Markup -0.0147* (0.00873) 0.00640 (0.0109) 0.0211 (0.00915) 29313 
Fixed effect model. Time dummies, industry-specific and country-specific linear trends included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** 
p<0.05 *** p<0.01. NN=10 with caliper. 
Table 7 – Robustness check – One nearest neighbour matching  
  
Phase 1  
(2005-2007) 
  
Phase 2  
(2008-2012) 
  
Difference Phase 
2 - Phase 1 
  N 
log(VA) 0.00667 (0.0248) 0.0382 (0.0345) 0.0316 (0.0283) 13959 
log(emp) 0.0107 (0.0380) 0.162*** (0.0587) 0.152*** (0.0468) 14626 
log(VA/L) -0.0247 (0.0218) -0.0584** (0.0267) -0.0337 (0.0215) 12755 
log(av wage) -0.00325 (0.0131) -0.00750 (0.0161) -0.00424 (0.0126) 13161 
TFP -0.0138** (0.00625) -0.0179** (0.00861) -0.00408 (0.00628) 9075 
ROI -0.00201 (0.00311) -0.000306 (0.00349) 0.00171 (0.00320) 15393 
log(GFCF) 0.0888 (0.0634) 0.244*** (0.0814) 0.155** (0.0713) 8935 
log(turnover) 0.0247 (0.0313) 0.148*** (0.0549) 0.123** (0.0489) 15546 
Markup -0.0258**  (0.0108)  -0.00435  (0.0133)  0.0215* (0.0110) 8500 
Fixed effect model. Time dummies, industry-specific and country-specific linear trends included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** 
p<0.05 *** p<0.01. NN=10 with caliper. 
Table 8 – Robustness check – Strongly balanced panel 
  
Phase 1 (2005-
2007) 
  
Phase 2 (2008-
2012) 
  
Difference Phase 
2 - Phase 1 
  N N treated 
log(VA) 0.0162 (0.0188) 0.0635** (0.0286) 0.0472** (0.0228) 33869 471 
log(emp) -0.00205 (0.0337) 0.0505 (0.0485) 0.0526 (0.0373) 33198 491 
log(VA/L) -0.00658 (0.0179) -0.0336 (0.0225) -0.0270 (0.0186) 25421 380 
log(av wage) 0.00860 (0.0116) -0.00758 (0.0127) -0.0162* (0.00970) 28336 414 
TFP -0.0160*** (0.00613) -0.0243*** (0.00834) -0.00826 (0.00592) 20750 359 
ROI -0.00510** (0.00237) -0.00786*** (0.00262) -0.00277 (0.00239) 40964 582 
log(GFCF) 0.0502 (0.0613) 0.217*** (0.0703) 0.167*** (0.0605) 13850 223 
log(turnover) 0.0353 (0.0250) 0.124*** (0.0319) 0.0883*** (0.0232) 41800 589 
Markup -0.0156 (0.0106) 0.0111 (0.0134) 0.0267** (0.0104) 19400 336 
Fixed effect model. Time dummies, industry-specific and country-specific linear trends included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
NN=10 with caliper. 
Table 9 – Interaction between EU ETS and firm-specific emission intensity 
  log(VA) log(emp) log(VA/L) log(av wage) TFP ROI log(GFCF) log(turnover) Markup 
Phase 1 (2005-2007) 0.0392 0.149** -0.0247 -0.00320 -0.0195* 0.00581 0.104 0.128** -0.0203 
 
(0.0371) (0.0603) (0.0292) (0.0172) (0.0104) (0.00446) (0.0944) (0.0550) (0.0163) 
Phase 2 (2008-2012) 0.0620 0.168* -0.0266 0.00392 -0.0326** -0.00270 0.308*** 0.323*** -0.00828 
 
(0.0495) (0.0945) (0.0362) (0.0182) (0.0128) (0.00501) (0.109) (0.0764) (0.0212) 
Phase 1 (2005-2007)  -0.00420 -0.0224** 0.00216 0.00125 0.000588 -0.00158** 0.00798 -0.0133 0.000910 
x log(emiss_int,firm) (0.00567) (0.00946) (0.00454) (0.00255) (0.00143) (0.000622) (0.0136) (0.00997) (0.00239) 
Phase 2 (2008-2012)  -0.000616 -0.0138 -0.000793 -0.00140 0.00142 -0.000334 -0.0115 -0.0283** 0.00237 
 x log(emiss_int,firm) (0.00780) (0.0151) (0.00563) (0.00291) (0.00184) (0.000718) (0.0174) (0.0137) (0.00313) 
N 49956 51473 45910 47310 30491 55894 31475 56072 29313 
Fixed effect model. Time dummies, industry-specific and country-specific linear trends included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
NN=10 with caliper. 
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Table 10 – Interaction between EU ETS and sector-specific emission intensity 
  log(VA) log(emp) log(VA/L) log(av wage) TFP ROI log(GFCF) log(turnover) Markup 
Phase 1 (2005-2007) 0.0795** -0.0405 0.0760** 0.0805*** -0.0183* -0.00490 0.199** 0.0230 -0.0295 
 
(0.0324) (0.0630) (0.0304) (0.0179) (0.00937) (0.00389) (0.0910) (0.0574) (0.0186) 
Phase 2 (2008-2012) 0.145*** 0.120 0.0705* 0.0701*** -0.0154 -0.0122*** 0.278** 0.199** -0.0156 
 
(0.0546) (0.0884) (0.0399) (0.0221) (0.0133) (0.00417) (0.131) (0.0837) (0.0239) 
Phase 1 (2005-2007) -0.0184*** 0.0117 -0.0236*** -0.0202*** 0.000680 -0.00000822 -0.0114 0.00539 0.00361 
x log(emiss_int, sect) (0.00683) (0.0126) (0.00679) (0.00401) (0.00221) (0.000874) (0.0217) (0.0113) (0.00436) 
Phase 2 (2008-2012) -0.0240** -0.0119 -0.0276*** -0.0200*** -0.00216 0.00191* -0.0108 -0.0166 0.00546 
 x log(emiss_int, sect) (0.0120) (0.0186) (0.00975) (0.00549) (0.00342) (0.00108) (0.0297) (0.0170) (0.00567) 
N 49956 51473 45910 47310 30491 55894 31475 56072 29313 
Fixed effect model. Time dummies, industry-specific and country-specific linear trends included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
NN=10 with caliper. 
Table 11 - Interaction between EU ETS and 'trade-in-permits' activity status 
  log(VA) log(emp) log(VA/L) log(av wage) TFP ROI log(GFCF) log(turnover) Markup 
Phase 1 (2005-2007) -0.00123 0.0466* -0.0301 -0.00788 -0.0182*** -0.00464* 0.117** 0.0570** -0.0190**  
 
(0.0190) (0.0260) (0.0187) (0.00999) (0.00563) (0.00256) (0.0559) (0.0249) (0.00915)  
Phase 2 (2008-2012) 0.0352 0.128*** -0.0502** -0.0141 -0.0204*** -0.00395 0.224*** 0.162*** 0.00719  
 
(0.0300) (0.0412) (0.0234) (0.0112) (0.00777) (0.00290) (0.0597) (0.0359) (0.0124)  
Phase 1 (2005-2007) 0.0388 -0.122** 0.0594* 0.0387** 0.00724 0.000697 0.111 -0.0450 0.0140  
x Active (0.0348) (0.0594) (0.0304) (0.0179) (0.00951) (0.00400) (0.0815) (0.0461) (0.0188)  
Phase 2 (2008-2012) 0.0677 -0.144 0.0571 0.0272 -0.00942 -0.00261 0.0380 -0.0668 -0.00248  
 x Active (0.0516) (0.103) (0.0383) (0.0230) (0.0126) (0.00441) (0.107) (0.0734) (0.0221)  
N 49956 51473 45910 47310 30491 55894 31475 56072 29313  
Fixed effect model. Time dummies, industry-specific and country-specific linear trends included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
NN=10 with caliper. 
Table 12 - Interaction between EU ETS and environmental patenting activity 
 
log(VA) log(emp) log(VA/L) log(av wage) TFP ROI log(GFCF) log(turnover) Markup 
Phase 1 (2005-2007) 0.0120 0.0109 -0.0186 0.00599 -0.0174*** -0.00645*** 0.147*** 0.0396 -0.0196**  
 
(0.0184) (0.0276) (0.0166) (0.00955) (0.00526) (0.00224) (0.0487) (0.0245) (0.00901)  
Phase 2 (2008-2012) 0.0540** 0.0949** -0.0429** -0.00635 -0.0199*** -0.00590** 0.218*** 0.132*** 0.00286  
 
(0.0269) (0.0423) (0.0215) (0.0120) (0.00669) (0.00254) (0.0567) (0.0353) (0.0110)  
Phase 1 (2005-2007)  -0.0145 -0.120 0.130** -0.0206 0.0198 0.0320*** 0.0834 -0.00864 0.0886*** 
x Patents (dummy) (0.0550) (0.0807) (0.0583) (0.0298) (0.0192) (0.00760) (0.152) (0.0505) (0.0286)  
Phase 2 (2008-2012)  0.0287 -0.315 0.196** 0.0184 -0.0641 0.0173* 0.221 0.0317 0.0699  
x Patents (dummy)  (0.102) (0.231) (0.0950) (0.0416) (0.0394) (0.00989) (0.209) (0.0941) (0.0527)  
N 49956 51473 45910 47310 30491 55894 31475 56072 29313  
Fixed effect model. Time dummies, industry-specific and country-specific linear trends included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
NN=10 with caliper. 
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Appendix A - Verified emissions in establishments active in the 
second phase only 
Table 13 – Verified emissions by facility status in the first two phases of the EU ETS 
Emissions Active in phase I Active in phase II only Total 
2005-2007 
5,900 
(100%) 
NA 5,900 
2008-2012 
13,500 
(92.53%) 
1,090 
(7.47%) 
14,590 
Total 
19,400 
(94.68%) 
1,090 
(5.32%) 
20,490 
Millions of tons of verified CO2 emissions. Own elaboration on the EU-CITL data 
